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Bramblett v. Commonwealth
Nos. 981394, 981395, 1999 WL 101069
(Va. Feb. 26, 1999)
L Facts
Earl Conrad Bramblett ("Bramblett") was found guilty of capital
murder and sentenced to death for the murders of four people, including
two children in the town of Vinton, in Roanoke County.' The victims
were found on Monday, August 29, 1994 by firefighters and police who
responded to a house fire, which, it was later determined, was purposely
set.2 In the downstairs living room, they found the body of Teresa Lynn
Fulcher Hodges who had been strangled, doused with gasoline, and set on
fire.3 Her husband and children were in upstairs bedrooms and all three had
died from gunshots to the head.4 The two girls, Winter Ashley Hodges, age
eleven, and Anah Michelle Hodges, age three, were found in the same bed,
and Anah's body was covered with soot and had sustained minor burns.'
The father had been killed many hours before the rest of his family, proba-
bly the afternoon before the female victims were killed.6
Ninety-eight witnesses testified during the trial, only four of whom
were called by defense during the guilt phase.7 The Commonwealth's
evidence was of three general types: lay witnesses who testified about events
surrounding the crime, including the relationship between Bramblett and
the Hodges; DNA and weapons evidence; and a convicted felon who had
been incarcerated with Bramblett and claimed that Bramblett related the
events of the crime to him.
Bramblett had been a good friend of the Hodges family for years, and
he was seen at their house and in a nearby national forest with the mother
and daughters the day before the crime was discovered.8 Several friends of
the Hodges had contacted or tried to contact them the day before the bodies
1. Bramblett v. Commonwealth, Nos. 981394, 981395, 1999 WL 101069, at *1 (Va.
Feb. 26, 1999).
2. Id., at *5.




7. Id, at *1-2.
8. IdL, at *3.
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were found.' Blaine Hodges spoke by phone with a friend around 5:00 p.m.
on Saturday, but later attempts to reach him were unsuccessful.10 Several
sets of witnesses who stopped by the house on Sunday evening and the
person who discovered and reported the fire early Monday morning, saw
notes on the doors left by Theresa Hodges for Blaine Hodges." Another
witness spotted a truck that resembled Bramblett's leaving the Hodges'
house at 4:30 Monday morning, just before the fire was reported. 2
Bramblett showed up at his workplace at 5:08 a.m., which was 4.7 miles
from the Hodges' house, about a twelve- minute drive at that early hour. 3
At 5:00 p.m. that same day, Bramblett went to the Vinton police station
because the police wanted to ask him about his friendship with the
Hodges. 4 During this initial interview, Bramblett became upset and asked
if he was going to be charged with murder." Two days later, the police
went to a motel room where Bramblett was staying and he again became
very upset and said that he had thought about suicide.'6 He agreed to return
to the police station at noon that day, but never showed up. 7 The police,
"concern[ed] about his safety," went to his motel room and had the owner
of the motel open Bramblett's door when he did not respond to their
knocks." While the officers were standing in the doorway, Bramblett
arrived in a taxi and spoke with the officers briefly.' Later that day, two of
Blaine Hodges's brothers went to the room to talk to Bramblett, one of
whom wore a wire at the urging of the police.2" The following day, the
police got a warrant and searched the room.2' Two days after the police
spoke with him, Bramblett showed up at his sister's home in Indiana, where
he told her about the deaths of the Hodges and the subsequent police
questioning, but he left abruptly after staying only a few hours. 2 Bramblett





12. Id, at -1, *3.
13. Id., at *3.








22. Id, at *7.
23. Id., at *1.
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At the trial, a firearms expert testified that the bullets recovered from
the bodies had all been fired from the same gun and that a cartridge found
at the crime scene matched one found in the defendant's truck.24 A forensics
expert for the Commonwealth also claimed that bullets found at the scene
were of identical composition as a bullet that was found in a storage room
rented by Bramblett. Also, DNA tests matched a pubic hair found on the
children's bed to Bramblett's pubic hair.
26
IL Holding
The Virginia Supreme Court decided that the trial court committed no
reversible error and that Bramblett's death sentence was proper."'
III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia 28
24. Id, at* 4.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id, at *11.
28. Several issues, though raised by Bramblett and addressed by the court, will not be
discussed in detail in this case note. Some turned on facts particular to the case; others were
dismissed in a summary fashion. These include:
(1) Change of venue. Bramblett based his argument on the fact that there was extensive
media coverage of the crimes and his capture. The court took his motion under advisement,
but denied it after jury selection ended. The Virginia Supreme Court took into consideration
.the ease with which the jury was selected." Bramblett, 1999 WL 101069, at *5.
(2) Competency. Three psychologists evaluated Bramblett and each had a slightly
different opinion as to his competency to stand trial. The first psychologist was concerned
about Bramblett's competency and asked the court to have someone else evaluate him. Two
other psychologists were eventually appointed, and both diagnosed Bramblett as having a
delusional disorder of the persecutory type. However, they both declared their belief that
Bramblett was competent. Bramblett, 1999 WL 101069, at *6.
(3) Motions to suppress. This court considered the following two of Bramblett's
motions to suppress: (i) evidence gained during the search of his motel room; and (ii) a box
of.audio tapes and pictures of the Hodges children that were in the possession of his sister.
Regarding the motel search, Bramblett did not challenge the search with the warrant, but
only the first search when the police officers had the door opened. The court denied the
motion because no evidence was seized at that time, holding that there was no search. The
other motion was more complicated. About a year before the murders, Bramblett mailed
two boxes to his sister, telling her to hold them for him and that she could have them in case
anything happened to him. After he showed up at her house and told her about the police
investigation, the sister contacted the local sheriff and consented to let him search the
containers. Inside, there were pictures of the Hodges' children and sixty-two audio tapes on
which "Bramblett expressed a sexual interest in Winter Hodges and his belief that the child's
parents were trying to 'set him up' or entrap him in a sexual act with her.'" Bramblett, 1999
WL 101069, at *4, *7. Bramblett argued that the police needed a warrant to open the boxes
because his sister did not have authority to consent to a search. The court wrote, "[t]he sister
had boxes addressed to her in her exclusive possession. Bramblett imposed no restrictions
with respect to the contents. Thus, he had no remaining expectation of privacy in the items.




A critical part of the evidence against Bramblett was compiled and
explained at trial by the Commonwealth's experts. The Virginia Supreme
Court mentioned at least four types of evidence that requires expert prepara-
tion: forensics, ballistics, DNA, and video reenactment.29 The other wit-
nesses, with the exception of the jailhouse informant, did not play a large
role in the police investigation and the Commonwealth's case at trial, since
it was common for Bramblett to be seen with the Hodges and no one placed
him directly at the crime scene at the time of the offense.
When expert testimony plays such a large role in the Commonwealth's
case, the court has a responsibility to grant the defendant's request for his
volunteered by private citizens." Id., at *7 (citing Ritter v. Commonwealth, 173 S.E.2d 799,
804 (Va. 1970)). The court offered little explanation and only one case to support its assertion
that Bramblett had "no remaining expectation of privacy" in the packages. The court
acknowledged that he told his sister "to keep the boxes for him," and it did not address the
fact that the sister apparently thought they were not hers to open. Id., at *7.
(4) Vagueness of aggravating factors. Bramblett claimed that "the statute dealing with
the capital sentencing proceeding is unconstitutional because the aggravating factors 'are
vague and do not adequately channel the discretion of the jury.'" Bramblet t , 1999 WL 101069,
at *2 (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 146-49 (Va. 1978)). The court noted
that it had rejected this argument in prior cases and would not discuss it. Id., at *2 (citing
Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 146-149).
(5) Sufficiency of evidence for conviction. The court declared that the evidence used
to convict was "overwhelming" and reviewed pieces of evidence not already considered thus
far in the opinion. Bramblett, 1999 WL 101069, at *9-10.
(6) Sufficiency of agravating evidence at penalty phase. The court decided that future
dangerousness was aply shown by Bramblett's "conduct with 1 1-year-old (sic] Winter
Hodges as well as his extensive and long-term planning and execution of the murders."
Bramblett, 1999 WL 101069, at *10.
(7) The jury was misinformed about his prior record. Bramblett claimed that "'all of
the factors used by the Commonwealth to enhance punishment concern events that occurred
two decades before the current offenses,'" but the court responded that "[t]he time gap of
decades affected only the weight to be accorded the evidence, not its admissibility."
Bramblett, 1999 WL 101069, at *10 (quoting George v. Commonwealth, 411 S.E.2d 12, 18
(Va. 1991)).
(8) Proportionality review. The court found that Bramblett's sentence was not
disproportionate because he was found guilty of "the senseless murder of a young child," and
he was "convicted of killing other persons." Bramblett, 1999 WL 101069, at *11.
(9) Bramblett also raised a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that should be noted,
though the court found it to be defaulted. The defense claimed that "the prosecutor withheld
evidence in violation of court orders and asked questions during the trial 'which he knew
were objectionable.'" Bramblett, 1999 WL 101069, at *2. The court held that the claim was
defaulted "because defendant did not ask the trial court to dismiss the indictments on the
foregoing grounds." Id. (citing VA. SuP. CT. R. 5:25). It is unclear whether the evolving
default doctrine of the Supreme Court of Virginia now requires that a particular remedy be
sought in order to preserve a claim.
29. The video was a reenactment of Bramblett's truck leaving the Hodges' house with
the street lights as illumination.
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own experts under Ake v. Oklahoma"0 and Husske v. Commonwealth." The
Ake court recognized that a trial may be fundamentally unfair if one side is
left without expert assistance. 2 The test in Virginia is set forth in Husske:
"an indigent defendant who seeks the appointment of an expert, at the
Commonwealth's expense, must show a particularized need for such ser-
vices and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.""
Although Ake dealt with only psychiatric experts, its reasoning and
holding has been extended to a variety of expert witnesses. The Virginia
Supreme Court recognized this expansion in Husske, stating, "[w]e are of the
opinion that Ake and Caldwell, when read together, require that the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, upon request, provide indigent defendants with 'the
basic tools of an adequate defense,' and that in certain instances, these basic
tools may include the appointment of non-psychiatric experts."34 The court
qualified this assertion by stating that the "Due Process requirement, how-
ever, does not confer a right upon an indigent defendant to receive, at the
Commonwealth's expense, all assistance that a non-indigent defendant may
purchase" and that the defendant must take care to show that appointment
of an expert is necessary and important to the defense.3"
In cases such as Bramblett's, where the Commonwealth has a legion of
experts, such a need may very well have been shown. When making a
motion to receive funding and appointment of an expert witness, defense
counsel must be careful and make more than a generalized statement of why
an expert is needed. 6 Additionally, counsel should keep in mind that there
are experts in a variety of areas, not just psychiatrists and DNA experts. A
recent publication of the Habeas Assistance and Training Counsel, entitled
"Summaries of Successful Cases Under Ake v. Oklahoma or Analogous to
Ake," provides summaries of successful Ake claims in a variety of areas, from
pediatricians to hypnotists. Defense attorneys may contact the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse for a copy of this important document.
B. Jailhouse Confession
Another important piece of evidence presented by the Commonwealth
was the testimony of Tracy Turner ("Turner"), a convicted felon who was
30. 470 U.S. 68, 91 (1985).
31. 476 S.E.2d 920, 930 (Va. 1996).
32. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
33. Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 926 (Va. 1996).
34. Id at 924 (quoting Ake, 470 US. at 77; citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320
(1985)).
35. Id.
36. Id at 926. (In Husske, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the defendant had
made a generalized statement and failed to show a particular need or any prejudice he
experienced because he lacked an expert.).
1999]
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incarcerated with Bramblett and who claimed that Bramblett confessed to
the murders. This jailhouse informant claimed that he and Bramblett
discussed Bramblett's addiction to young girls and that Teresa Hodges had
caught Bramblett with one of her daughters.37 He also related that
Bramblett believed that burning a house would effectively destroy evidence
and that Bramblett planned to make the murders look like a drug hit."
The prosecution had planned to use Turner's testimony for rebuttal,
but decided to use it in its case-in-chief after prosecutors suspected that the
defense knew of their plans. The prosecution made this decision on the
Thursday or Friday, and Turner testified the following Wednesday; on
Wednesday, the prosecution disclosed Turner's name and criminal record
to defense. 9 The defense moved to bar Turner's testimony on the grounds
that it did not have enough time to investigate Turner, and that the "prose-
cutor's failure to disclose Turner's criminal history violated the court's prior
discovery orders and due process."" The trial court denied the motion, but
offered to allow the defense to postpone the cross-examination in order to
investigate further.4' After the testimony, the defense moved for either a
mistrial or for the court to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony.42
Again, the motions were denied, and, on direct review, the Virginia Su-
preme Court found no error in this denial.43 The court found that "five or
six days" was enough time to investigate, that the defendant did not accept
the trial court's offer to delay cross-examination, and that the defendant did
not demonstrate any specific prejudice from the delay in disclosure.44 It held
that "[i]f exculpatory evidence is obtained in time for it to be used effec-
tively by the defendant, and there is no showing that an accused has been
prejudiced, there is no due process violation."45
The Bramblett decision acknowledged the right of defendants to receive
information about the informant that the Commonwealth plans to use at
trial. The court stated, "[o]f course, [the] defendant was entitled to disclo-
sure of exculpatory evidence, including evidence that impeaches the credibil-
ity of a prosecution witness, under Brady v. Maryland."' However, while
the trial court and the Virginia Supreme Court only considered disclosure
37. Bramblett, 1999 WL 101069, at *4.
38. Id
39. Id, at *8.
40. Id, at *9.
41. Id., at *8.
42. Id, at *9.
43. Although the court does not mention it, defense counsel raised this issue very
forcefully.
44. Bramblett, 1999 WL 101069, at *9.
45. Id, at *9.
46. Id. (citing Robinson v. Commonwealth, 341 S.E.2d 159, 164 (Va. 1986); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
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of the informant's criminal record, the law provides that far more material
be disclosed by the Commonwealth. Indeed, the Bramblett court acknowl-
edged this also. 7 In addition to the criminal record, defense counsel should
request, possibly using the language of Bramblett, the circumstances sur-
rounding the alleged statements, other witnesses from the jail, any contact
the informant may have had with a representative from the prosecution, the
existence of promises or threats made to the informant by the Common-
wealth's attorneys, and any prior acts or statements that may affect the
informant's credibility. All of these pieces of information fall under Brady
and should be turned over if defense counsel requests them.
Robert H. Robinson, Jr.
47. Id
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